GR L 10610; (May, 1958) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-10610; May 26, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ERNESTO SILVELA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Ernesto A. Silvela was arrested in Iloilo upon a sworn complaint by Rosalia Bermejo Palauar, preliminarily investigated by the City Fiscal. The complaint alleged that the accused signed, sent, and addressed two unsealed letters to the complainant containing false, malicious, and defamatory libel, imputing to her the words “Pompom, Naga Business, Naga Prostitute, Prostitute.” The letters, dated September 21 and September 25, 1955, were quoted verbatim in the complaint. In the first letter, Silvela, responding to a letter from the complainant to his brother-in-law, advised her to change the term “naga-business” to “naga prostitute,” stating “the most appropriate English term for ‘pom-pom’ is prostitute.” In the second letter, responding to the complainant’s request to rectify the term “prostitute,” Silvela refused, stating, “I cannot acquiesce to your kind request. I have been trained in my profession to be exact to the smallest fraction; hence, I always call a spade, a spade, and a shovel, a shovel. Besides, I cannot pick a more refined term for your implied idea of a ‘pompom.’ At any rate, I mean every word I say and I’m conscious of its consequences.” Before arraignment, Silvela moved to quash, contending the facts charged did not constitute an offense. The judge dismissed the case, ruling that upon reading the two letters, it did not appear defamatory words were directed against the complainant.
ISSUE
Whether the facts charged in the complaint constitute the offense of libel.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and remanded the record to the court below for further proceedings. The Court held that the letters contained libelous matter. The imputations, calling the complainant a “prostitute,” were clearly defamatory and referred to the addressee. The motion to quash admitted the allegations of the complaint, including that the defendant willfully and maliciously imputed the defamatory words to the complainant. Regarding publication, an essential element of libel, the Court found that the complaint alleged the letters were “unsealed.” Citing U.S. vs. Griño and American jurisprudence, the Court held that in criminal prosecutions, communication of the defamation to the person defamed constitutes publication, especially when done with intent to provoke a breach of the peace. Sending an unsealed letter is publication. The Court distinguished Lopez vs. Delgado, which involved a civil case and a sealed envelope. The Fiscal’s assertion that he could prove at trial that the offensive words referred to the complainant was sufficient at the motion to quash stage.