G.R. No. L-10577; March 30, 1915
T. L. McGIRR, plaintiff, vs. L. PORTER HAMILTON and JOSE C. ABREU, judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
The plaintiff, T. L. McGirr, initiated an action for debt in the justice’s court of Manila to recover P599 for services rendered. The justice’s court rendered judgment in his favor for P466. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which, after a trial de novo, rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of P465.70. The defendant excepted to this judgment and sought to perfect a bill of exceptions to appeal to the Supreme Court. The respondent judge, Jose C. Abreu, denied approval of the bill of exceptions. The denial was based on Section 16 of Act No. 1627 , which provided that judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance on appeal from a justice’s court “shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or municipal ordinance.” Since no such constitutional issue was involved, the judge held that no further appeal to the Supreme Court was permissible. McGirr then filed this original action for mandamus to compel the judge to allow and approve the bill of exceptions, arguing that Section 16 of Act No. 1627 was invalid.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 16 of Act No. 1627 , which makes judgments of the Court of First Instance on appeal from a justice’s court final and conclusive (absent a constitutional question), is valid, or whether it unconstitutionally diminishes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, holding that the challenged portion of Act No. 1627 was invalid.

The Court ruled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was definitively established by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Section 9 of that Act provided that the Supreme Court “shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided,” subject to changes in practice and procedure only. Prior to the Act of Congress, Philippine statutes (specifically Act No. 136 and the Code of Civil Procedure) conferred upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments of Courts of First Instance, without distinction as to whether the case originated in that court or came to it on appeal from a justice’s court. This was affirmed in the earlier case of Eleizegui vs. Lawn Tennis Club.

Since the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, adopted and confirmed this existing jurisdiction, the Philippine Legislature, as a subordinate legislative body, lacked the authority to materially diminish or alter that jurisdiction. Therefore, Section 16 of Act No. 1627 , insofar as it prohibited appeals to the Supreme Court from judgments of the Court of First Instance rendered on appeal from a justice’s court, was repugnant to the superior Act of Congress and consequently void.

The Court rejected the argument that its prior, silent acquiescence to the statute over time validated it. The protection of constitutional (or, in this context, fundamental statutory) rights cannot be forfeited by the neglect of others to assert them. The demurrer was overruled, and the respondents were ordered to answer or, failing that, the writ of mandamus would be issued.