G.R. No. L-10215; April 30, 1958
ANDRES E. VARELA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CRISTINA MARAJAS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The plaintiff-appellant, Andres E. Varela, filed a complaint on December 6, 1954. He alleged that his brother, Mariano Rodriguez Varela, died intestate on September 5, 1940, leaving an estate worth P45,000. The estate was settled via a written agreement among the heirs dated February 14, 1941, which was approved by the court on April 7, 1941. The agreement stipulated that Carmelo Bautista (father of the defendants-appellees) was an acknowledged natural child of the deceased. It further provided that the appellant, who had long been absent and unheard from, would be given a share equivalent to P12,000, which Carmelo Bautista would pay in money or property upon the appellant’s appearance. The appellant sought to recover this amount from the appellees, as successors of Carmelo Bautista, who allegedly refused to pay. The Court of First Instance of Batangas dismissed the complaint upon the defendants’ motion, ruling that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, as more than ten years had elapsed since its accrual on April 7, 1941 (the date of court approval). The lower court held the appellant’s knowledge or lack thereof of his right was immaterial for prescription.

ISSUE

Whether the cause of action to recover the P12,000 was barred by the statute of limitations, specifically whether it accrued on April 7, 1941 (the date of court approval of the agreement) or upon the appellant’s later appearance and demand for payment.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal. The Court held that the lower court erred in ruling that the cause of action accrued on April 7, 1941. The agreement expressly provided that the P12,000 would be paid to the appellant “upon his appearance,” with no fixed period for such appearance. The appellant was unaware of the arrangement until he returned to the Philippines in November 1945. His right to sue commenced only from the moment he presented himself (i.e., appeared) and payment was not made. It would be absurd to require him to present himself without first knowing of the obligation. The situation was analogous to a written indebtedness payable within a stated period, where the cause of action accrues upon expiration of that period if payment is not made, not from the date of the agreement. This conclusion was the same whether the right was based on the February 14, 1941 agreement or the April 7, 1941 court order, as the order did not alter the agreement’s terms. Therefore, the cause of action was not barred by prescription. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.