GR L 10016; (February, 1957) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-10016; February 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The accused, Proceso S. Aragon, contracted his first marriage with Maria Gorrea on September 28, 1925. While this marriage was subsisting, he contracted a second marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934. His first wife, Maria Gorrea, died on August 5, 1939. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu. In 1953, while Maria Faicol was away for medical treatment, the accused contracted a third marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953. The accused admitted to the third marriage but attempted to deny the second marriage with Maria Faicol, which the trial court found to be fully established by evidence. He was prosecuted and convicted of bigamy by the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
ISSUE
Whether the accused can be validly convicted of bigamy for contracting the third marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang, given that his second marriage to Maria Faicol was void ab initio (as it was contracted while his first marriage was subsisting) but had not been judicially declared null prior to the third marriage.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted the accused. The Court held that for a prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to prosper, the subsequent marriage must be contracted before the former marriage has been legally dissolved. Applying the rule of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, and following its prior ruling in People vs. Mendoza, the Court ruled that a marriage void ab initio (like the second marriage to Maria Faicol) requires a judicial declaration of nullity to dissolve it for the purpose of the bigamy law. In the absence of such judicial declaration prior to the third marriage, the accused cannot be held liable for bigamy for contracting that third marriage. The Court noted that the complaint was filed by the second wife, Maria Faicol, and that her marriage with the accused was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage. Therefore, the last marriage was considered valid for the purposes of this prosecution. The acquittal was without prejudice to a prosecution for contracting the second bigamous marriage (i.e., the marriage to Maria Faicol while married to Maria Gorrea).