GR 97535; (August, 1995) (Digest)
G.R. No. 97535 August 4, 1995
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Judge BENIGNO T. DAYAW, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 80, Quezon City, and Deputy Sheriff JOSE MARTINEZ, RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent La Campana Food Products, Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary injunction against petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) to prevent disconnection for alleged unpaid differential and underbilling. Summons was served on Meralco on August 23, 1990. The case was re-raffled to Branch 80, presided by respondent Judge Benigno T. Dayaw. On September 7, 1990, Meralco filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer. This motion was defective for lack of a notice of hearing as required by the Rules of Court. Meralco filed its Answer with Counterclaim on September 21, 1990, beyond the reglementary period but within its requested extension.
Due to Meralco’s failure to file a timely answer, La Campana filed an ex-parte motion to declare defendant in default, which the trial court granted. After ex-parte proceedings, the court rendered a decision ordering Meralco to reconnect electric service, refund a sum with interest, and pay attorney’s fees. Instead of appealing, Meralco filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, which was denied. Meralco then filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court denied for being filed out of time. Meralco subsequently filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Meralco in default, denying its motion to set aside the judgment, and denying its notice of appeal.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that Meralco’s motion for extension of time was a “worthless piece of paper” for lacking a mandatory notice of hearing, rendering the subsequent filing of its answer beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, Meralco was already in default and not entitled to notice of the motion to declare it in default. The Court also ruled that Meralco’s motion to set aside the judgment was a pro forma motion as it failed to specify with particularity the alleged extrinsic fraud, which is a required ground for a new trial. Being pro forma, it did not interrupt the period to appeal. Meralco’s notice of appeal was thus filed out of time. The special civil action of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The trial court’s orders and the writ of execution were declared valid.
