G.R. No. 94555 August 17, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO LABALAN OCIMAR and ALEXANDER CORTEZ MENDOZA, accused-appellants.

FACTS

Accused-appellants Eduardo Labalan Ocimar and Alexander Cortez Mendoza, along with others, were charged with violating P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974) for robbing passengers and the driver of a Baliuag Transit bus on October 19, 1986, in Balagtas, Bulacan, and for the killing of Capt. Cirilo Cañeba, Jr. during the robbery. Ocimar and Mendoza pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused, Alfonso Ramos Bermudez, pleaded guilty but was later discharged by the trial court to be utilized as a state witness after the prosecution moved for his discharge. Bermudez testified that on the day of the crime, he was fetched by Ocimar, Mendoza, and others. The group planned the robbery at a hideout, then boarded the bus at Cubao, Quezon City. During the robbery, Mendoza announced the holdup and poked a gun at the driver, while Ocimar was seen shooting Capt. Cañeba. The robbers alighted in Balagtas, Bulacan, and fled. The trial court convicted Ocimar and Mendoza as co-principals and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua, ordering them to pay indemnities and damages. They appealed, arguing that the discharge of Bermudez was improper, that his testimony was not credible, and that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They also presented alibis.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court erred in discharging accused Bermudez to be utilized as a state witness despite his prior guilty plea.
2. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Bermudez.
3. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

1. No, the trial court did not err in discharging Bermudez. Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the discharge of an accused to be a state witness is allowed even after a guilty plea, provided no judgment has been rendered. Since no judgment had been rendered against Bermudez at the time of his discharge, it was proper. The requisites for discharge were satisfied: there was absolute necessity for his testimony, his testimony could be substantially corroborated, he did not appear to be the most guilty, and he had not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
2. No, the trial court did not err in giving credence to Bermudez’s testimony. His testimony was detailed, consistent, and corroborated on material points by other witnesses, such as the bus driver and a military officer passenger. The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect. Furthermore, his testimony was against his own penal interest, enhancing its reliability.
3. Yes, the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The positive identification and detailed testimony of Bermudez, corroborated by other evidence, established their participation in the conspiracy to commit highway robbery and homicide. Their defenses of alibi were weak and could not prevail over the positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were elsewhere when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the crime scene. They failed to do so. The court affirmed the conviction but increased the death indemnity from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The awards for funeral expenses (P45,000.00), moral damages (P25,000.00), and loss of expected support (P720,000.00) were affirmed.