G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, vs. Hon. Omar U. Amin, et al., and People of the Philippines, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Subsequently, government prosecutors filed a separate information before the RTC of Makati, charging Enrile with violating Presidential Decree No. 1829 for allegedly harboring or concealing former Colonel Gregorio Honasan in his home on December 1, 1989, thereby obstructing Honasan’s apprehension. Enrile filed motions to quash this second information, arguing that the alleged act of harboring was a component element of the rebellion charge and that a separate prosecution was prohibited.
The respondent judges denied Enrile’s motions, finding probable cause for the PD 1829 violation. They sustained the separate charge on the theory that rebellion under the Revised Penal Code is a general law, while PD 1829 is a special law, permitting distinct prosecutions. Enrile elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari, contending that the respondent judges committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the information.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner can be separately prosecuted for violation of PD No. 1829 (obstruction of justice) for harboring a co-conspirator, given the pending rebellion case against him based on the same occasion.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and quashed the information. The Court anchored its ruling on the doctrine established in People v. Hernandez and recently reiterated in Enrile v. Salazar, which prohibits the complexing of rebellion with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, or the splitting of such component acts into separate prosecutions. The legal logic is that acts committed in furtherance of rebellion, such as murder, arson, or in this case, harboring a co-conspirator, are absorbed by the crime of rebellion and constitute a single political offense.
The Court rejected the prosecution’s theory distinguishing between a general and a special law. It held that the decisive factor is the motive behind the act. If the act of harboring (under PD 1829) was done with political motives in furtherance of rebellion, it forms part of that rebellion and cannot be punished independently. Since a separate prosecution for rebellion was already pending in Quezon City, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 in Makati could not prosper. To allow it would violate the rule against splitting a single offense and subject the accused to double jeopardy. Consequently, the Court found no need to rule on Enrile’s other procedural arguments, made the preliminary injunction permanent, and ordered the information in the Makati case quashed.