GR 92403; (April, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 92403 April 22, 1992
VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Victor A. Aquino, then a Clerk II, was designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office on July 20, 1984, following the retirement of the Supply Officer I. On September 19, 1986, private respondent Leonarda D. de la Paz, also a Clerk II, was issued a promotional appointment as Supply Officer I. Her appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV as permanent, provided there was no pending administrative case, protest, or adverse decision. She assumed the position. On October 20, 1986, petitioner filed a protest with the DECS Secretary, questioning de la Paz’s qualifications. On May 4, 1987, the DECS Secretary sustained the protest, revoked de la Paz’s appointment, and ruled that Aquino be appointed Supply Officer I. Based on this, Aquino was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer I effective October 26, 1987, which was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV on October 27, 1987. De la Paz appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which upheld Aquino’s appointment on February 5, 1988. De la Paz then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On November 7, 1988, the CSC revoked Aquino’s appointment and restored de la Paz to the position, finding her better qualified. The CSC denied Aquino’s motion for reconsideration on February 27, 1990.
ISSUE
Whether or not public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner Victor A. Aquino as Supply Officer I and restoring private respondent Leonarda de la Paz on the ground that she was better qualified.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Service Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court distinguished this case from previous rulings where the CSC was found to have exceeded its authority by substituting its judgment for the appointing authority’s. In this case, the CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice but merely restored the appointment of de la Paz, who was first appointed to the contested position. Her permanent appointment, approved by the Civil Service Regional Office, was deemed complete upon her assumption of duties and receipt of compensation. Consequently, she acquired a legal right to the position protected by security of tenure. The CSC’s finding that she was better qualified merely supported the validity of restoring her to her previously approved appointment, as she met the prescribed qualification standards and eligibility for the position. The appointing authority could not effect her removal indirectly by revoking her completed appointment on the ground that the protestant was more qualified.
