G.R. No. 924 : May 1, 1902
PIO IVANCICH, petitioner, vs. ARTHUR F. ODLIN, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and the PACIFIC EXPORT LUMBER COMPANY, a corporation, respondents.

FACTS:
The respondent, Pacific Export Lumber Company, filed a libel (a maritime lawsuit) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Austrian steamer “Marguerite.” The libel alleged several claims, including: (1) expenses for coal and harbor dues paid by the libellant due to the vessel’s deviation and unseaworthiness, claimed as a general average loss; (2) damages from the alleged wrongful retention of freights by the vessel’s owners; (3) refusal to pay for coal remaining in the vessel’s bunkers; and (4) refusal to call for a general average contribution. Based on this ex parte libel, the respondent judge ordered the attachment (seizure) of the vessel.

The petitioner, the captain of the steamer, moved to dissolve the attachment and dismiss the libel, arguing it was a nullity. The court denied the motion. The petitioner then filed this action for a writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court. He sought to prohibit the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case and from detaining the vessel based on an ex parte libel, arguing that the procedure followed was not authorized under the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure but was instead an attempt to apply U.S. admiralty procedure not in force in the Islands.

ISSUE:
Whether a writ of prohibition should be issued to prevent the Court of First Instance from proceeding with the libel in rem and from detaining the vessel under the procedure it employed.

RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for a writ of prohibition.

The Court held that the respondent judge did not act without or in excess of his jurisdiction. While the old Spanish Law of Civil Procedure had been repealed, the Code of Commerce remained in force. Article 580 of the Code of Commerce enumerated various maritime liens, including claims for provisions and fuel supplied for the last voyage (which covered part of the libellant’s claim). Article 584 of the same Code provided the procedural mechanism for the judicial attachment and sale of a vessel to enforce such liens. Therefore, a complete substantive and procedural law existed within the still-operative Code of Commerce under which a vessel could be attached and sold to enforce a maritime lien.

Consequently, the judge had jurisdiction to order the attachment of the vessel. Any alleged error in the procedure followedsuch as the attachment being levied without the specific formalities of the new Code of Civil Procedurewas an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not a lack of jurisdiction itself. Such an error could be corrected through ordinary remedies available in the course of the litigation (e.g., appeal) and was not a proper ground for the extraordinary writ of prohibition. The petition was denied with costs against the petitioner.