GR 92349; (November, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990
MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Maria Luisa Estoesta was convicted of slight physical injuries by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Marikina. Her appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) resulted in a modified penalty of eleven days of straight imprisonment. Through counsel, she filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on August 30, 1989. Subsequently, acting without a lawyer, petitioner personally filed a motion for a 30-day extension with the Court of Appeals to file a petition for review, citing the need to find new counsel. The appellate court granted the extension.
However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner, again acting pro se, filed a “manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review” on October 9, 1989. Her stated purpose was to apply for probation, believing she qualified as a first offender. The Court of Appeals granted her withdrawal motion in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, and an entry of judgment was made on October 25, 1989. Upon realizing that her probation application was barred by law because she had perfected an appeal, petitioner, through counsel, filed a joint motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment on November 17, 1989, seeking to reinstate her appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reinstate her petition for review, considering she filed the motion to withdraw without legal assistance.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic rests on the principle of party autonomy in litigation under Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. This rule explicitly allows a party to conduct litigation personally or through an attorney in any court. A party who initially appears by counsel may validly choose to dispense with such services at any time and proceed pro se.
In this case, petitioner, after being represented by counsel in the MTC and RTC, voluntarily elected to represent herself before the Court of Appeals. Her personal acts—filing the extension request and, crucially, the motion to withdraw her appeal—were binding. The Court emphasized that while legal representation is advisable, it is a party’s right to appear personally. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the outcomes of her own voluntary decisions. Her subsequent change of mind, after suffering a disadvantage, does not invalidate her prior actions.
Furthermore, the Court found procedural infirmities barring relief. The motion for reconsideration and petition for relief were filed beyond the reglementary period after petitioner received the October 24 resolution. Additionally, the petition for relief lacked the required affidavit of merit. The conviction, based on corroborated testimony and evidence, had thus become final and executory.
