GR 92013; (July, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 92013 & G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents. DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.
FACTS
These consolidated petitions for prohibition sought to enjoin the government from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179-square-meter Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The property was acquired by the Philippine government under the 1956 Reparations Agreement with Japan as indemnification for losses during World War II. It was specifically procured for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. The embassy was transferred in 1976, and the property remained undeveloped. The Executive branch, through the Asset Privatization Trust, decided to sell the property and scheduled a public bidding.
Petitioners argued that the Roppongi property is property of public dominion, intended for public service (as an embassy chancery), and therefore beyond the commerce of man and cannot be alienated. They contended that its character as property of public dominion is permanent unless officially reclassified by law. The government, however, maintained that the property had lost its public character upon the embassy’s transfer and had become patrimonial property of the State, which could be lawfully sold.
ISSUE
The principal issue is whether the Roppongi property is classified as property of public dominion or patrimonial property of the State, and consequently, whether the Philippine government has the authority to sell it.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the Roppongi property remains property of public dominion and cannot be alienated. The legal logic hinges on the property’s designated purpose under the Reparations Agreement and Republic Act No. 1789 (the Reparations Law). The property was acquired specifically “for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy,” a clear public use pertaining to diplomatic service and national dignity. The Court emphasized that property acquired by the State for a public purpose is impressed with a public character.
The Court rejected the government’s claim that the property became patrimonial simply by non-use or the embassy’s relocation. For property of public dominion to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be a formal declaration or law by the State that the property is no longer needed for public use or service. No such positive act of reclassification was presented. The mere cessation of use does not automatically change its classification. Since the property is still property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man, and the State holds it in trust for the public. Therefore, the government lacks the legal authority to sell it. The petitions were granted, and the respondents were permanently enjoined from selling the Roppongi property.