G.R. No. 89606 . August 30, 1990.
AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Agustin Salgado was convicted of serious physical injuries and ordered to indemnify the victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr., the sums of P126,633.50 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages. He applied for and was granted probation. The probation order included a condition requiring him to indemnify the victim in monthly installments of P2,000.00. Lukban accepted and encashed six monthly checks paid pursuant to this condition.
Subsequently, Lukban filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the full civil liability as stated in the original criminal decision. The trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the original decision had become final and executory and could not be altered by the probation order, and that the Probation Law does not authorize the modification of civil liability.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court, in granting probation, could validly modify the mode of payment of the civil liability decreed in a final criminal judgment.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The core legal principle is the immutability of final judgments. The criminal decision, including its civil liability component, became final and executory when Salgado applied for probation, which constituted a waiver of his right to appeal. A final judgment can no longer be altered or modified by the court that rendered it, especially in any substantial way.
The Court rejected the argument that the probation order validly modified the civil aspect. The Probation Law (P.D. No. 968) only provides for the suspension of the execution of the criminal sentence; it does not authorize the suspension or alteration of the civil liability adjudged in the same decision. The civil liability is a vested right of the offended party, separate from the criminal penalty. The conditions for probation listed in the law pertain to the rehabilitation of the offender and do not include modifying a final money judgment in favor of the victim.
The acceptance of installment payments by Lukban did not estop him from demanding full execution. Estoppel requires voluntary acceptance of benefits with knowledge of the facts. Here, Lukban’s acceptance was merely a provisional arrangement for partial payment; it did not constitute a waiver of his right to enforce the entire judgment, nor did it validate an unauthorized modification of a final order. The probation condition regarding installment payment was void as it constituted an ultra vires amendment to a final and executory judgment. Therefore, the writ of execution for the full civil indemnity was properly issued.