G.R. No. 86899 -903 May 15, 1989
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Amor D. Deloso, the incumbent Provincial Governor of Zambales, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with five counts of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ( Republic Act No. 3019 ). The informations alleged that in 1978, while he was the Municipal Mayor of Botolan, Zambales, he gave unwarranted benefits to certain individuals by issuing municipal tractors without any rental agreements, causing undue injury to the municipality. After his motion to quash was denied and subsequent petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 . On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering his preventive suspension from his position as Governor and from any other office he held. Petitioner challenged this order, arguing the suspension was indefinite and that Section 13 should not apply to him as he was now a governor, not the mayor charged in the informations.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) Whether the preventive suspension order under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 , being indefinite in duration, violates due process; and (2) Whether the suspension provision applies to a public officer holding a position different from the one under which he was charged.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, modifying the suspension order. On the first issue, the Court, applying the principles of due process and equal protection as in Layno v. Sandiganbayan, ruled that an indefinite preventive suspension is unreasonable. The Court noted the potential for protracted delays in the Sandiganbayan, which could result in a suspension effectively lasting for years without a conviction, constituting a severe penalty. To prevent this mischief, the Court held that a preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 should be limited to ninety (90) days, aligning with the period specified in the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807). This period was deemed reasonable and appropriate.
On the second issue, the Court found petitioner’s argument untenable. Citing Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court clarified that the word “office” in the amendatory provision (B.P. Blg. 192) refers to any office the accused presently holds, not merely the specific office occupied when the alleged offense was committed. Therefore, Section 13 applies to incumbent public officers regardless of a change in position. The Court also noted that if grounds for suspension, such as witness intimidation, later manifest, the Sandiganbayan retains the authority to order suspension based on specific reasons, not merely the automatic application of the statute. The suspension of petitioner was thus limited to ninety days.