G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Amor D. Deloso, the incumbent Provincial Governor of Zambales, faced five criminal informations before the Sandiganbayan for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The charges stemmed from his prior tenure as Municipal Mayor of Botolan, Zambales, specifically for allegedly issuing municipal tractors to private individuals without rental agreements, thereby causing undue injury to the municipality. After his arraignment where he pleaded not guilty, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, issued a resolution on February 10, 1989, ordering his preventive suspension pendente lite from his position as governor pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. The suspension order did not specify a definite period.
Deloso filed this petition for certiorari, challenging the suspension order. He argued that the suspension provision was unconstitutional and, alternatively, that it was inapplicable to him because he was now charged for acts committed while he was a mayor, not in his current capacity as governor. He also contended that an indefinite suspension pending trial, which could be protracted, was oppressive.

ISSUE

The primary issue was whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of Governor Deloso without a definite time limit under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, modifying the suspension order. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, following its precedent in Layno v. Sandiganbayan. Instead, it resolved the case based on fundamental principles of due process and equal protection. The Court held that while preventive suspension is a valid precautionary measure, an indefinite suspension lasting for years due to trial delays becomes unreasonable and oppressive. It effectively punishes the accused before conviction and deprives the electorate of their chosen official without just cause.
To balance the state’s interest in preventing the accused from using his office to influence the proceedings with the accused’s right to due process, the Court ruled that a preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 must be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days. This period aligns with the limit set for non-elective officials under the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807). Beyond this period, the suspended official must be reinstated, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial.
Furthermore, the Court rejected Deloso’s argument on the inapplicability of the suspension provision. Citing Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, it held that the term “office” in the law refers to any incumbent office held by the accused, not merely the specific office occupied when the alleged offense was committed. Thus, suspension from his current position as governor was valid. The Court ordered that Deloso’s suspension be limited to ninety days, after which he must be reinstated.