GR 86561; (November, 1992) (Digest)
G.R. No. 86561 November 10, 1992
PABLO BERNARDO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE CECILIO F. BALAGOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, respondent.
FACTS
Pablo Bernardo was convicted of estafa by the Municipal Trial Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, on September 5, 1984, and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed the decision with modifications. He further appealed to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the decision on December 24, 1985. While his motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was pending in the Court of Appeals, Bernardo filed an application for probation dated February 3, 1986. The Municipal Judge denied the application on October 11, 1987, based on Section 4 of P.D. 968 as amended by P.D. 1990, which prohibits probation for an applicant who has appealed his conviction, and on Bernardo’s unsatisfactory conduct. Bernardo elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court via certiorari, which was denied. He then filed the present petition.
ISSUE
Whether Pablo Bernardo is entitled to probation despite having appealed his conviction, considering the amendments to the probation law.
RULING
The petition is DENIED. At the time Bernardo filed his application for probation on February 3, 1986, P.D. 1990, which amended P.D. 968, was already in effect. P.D. 1990 explicitly provides that no application for probation shall be granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The transitory provision in Section 3 of P.D. 1990 states that the amended Section 4 shall not apply to those who have already filed their applications for probation at the time of its effectivity. Since Bernardo filed his application after P.D. 1990 took effect on January 15, 1986, he is not covered by the exception and is thus governed by the amendment. The purpose of the amendment was to prevent an accused from exhausting the appeal process and then applying for probation, thereby rendering the appeal futile. Furthermore, probation is a discretionary privilege, and the denial based on the petitioner’s conduct (misrepresentation regarding the filing of his application) and the demands of justice was not a grave abuse of discretion. The favorable recommendation of the probation officer and the petitioner’s status as a first offender do not override the clear legal prohibition.