GR 86147; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 86147 . February 26, 1990.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Education, Culture & Sports, Child & Youth Research Center) and LUZ G. PALATTAO-CORPUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Luz Palattao-Corpuz was the Director of the Child and Youth Research Center (CYRC) under the DECS, while private respondent Jose Lopez, Jr., was its Assistant Director. Due to a history of conflict, including Lopez’s protest against Corpuz’s appointment, Minister Jaime Laya temporarily detailed Lopez to the MECS Legal Office in July 1984, later transferring him to the Planning Service. After over six months, Lopez unilaterally returned to his CYRC post on February 18, 1985, without securing prior official authorization from the Ministry. Corpuz issued memoranda stating Lopez would not be recognized as an active staff member until he presented proper clearance. Lopez insisted his detail was invalid as it exceeded permissible periods without his consent.
Lopez filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to compel Corpuz to recognize his attendance and pay his salaries. The RTC issued a Partial Decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordering Corpuz to take official cognizance of Lopez’s attendance at CYRC and to pay his salaries and benefits from April 23, 1985, onward. The case was remanded for further proceedings on damages.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Corpuz acted wrongfully in refusing to recognize respondent Lopez’s unauthorized return to the CYRC and in withholding his salaries, thereby justifying the award of back wages and exposing her to personal liability for damages.
RULING
The Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Corpuz’s refusal to recognize Lopez’s attendance was justified and lawful. Lopez’s return to the CYRC on February 18, 1985, was without the required prior authorization from the DECS Minister, constituting a rebellious defiance of a valid departmental directive. Official confirmation from the Ministry, received by Corpuz by April 22, 1985, explicitly required such authorization. Therefore, Corpuz acted within her administrative authority as CYRC Director in not considering him an active employee and in subsequently withholding his salaries from April 23 to August 14, 1985, due to his non-compliance.
The legal logic is twofold. First, on the substantive issue, a reassigned government employee cannot unilaterally abandon his new post and resume his former duties without official clearance. Corpuz was enforcing lawful orders from her superiors, and her actions were performed in her official capacity. Second, on the issue of liability, the adjudgment of damages against her is untenable. Since she acted within the scope of her official functions, any monetary liability would ultimately be a charge against the Republic of the Philippines. The state, under the doctrine of non-suability, cannot be held liable for monetary claims without its consent. The mere allegation that an official is sued in a personal capacity does not automatically remove the protection of this principle when the acts in question are clearly official in nature. Thus, the lower courts erred in ordering the payment of salaries for the unauthorized period and in allowing the damages claim to proceed.
