G.R. No. 86147 February 26, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Education, Culture & Sports, Child & Youth Research Center) and LUZ G. PALATTAO-CORPUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Luz Palattao-Corpuz and private respondent Jose Lopez, Jr., were the Director and Assistant Director, respectively, of the Child and Youth Research Center (CYRC) under the DECS. Due to internal conflict, then Minister Jaime Laya temporarily detailed Lopez to the MECS Legal Office on July 11, 1984, later transferring him to the Planning Service. After over six months, Lopez unilaterally returned to his CYRC post on February 18, 1985, without securing prior official authorization. Corpuz, as Director, issued memoranda stating he would not be recognized as an active staff member until he presented proper clearance. Lopez insisted his detail was invalid as it exceeded permissible periods without his consent.
Lopez filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to compel Corpuz to recognize his attendance and pay his salaries. The RTC issued a Partial Decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordering Corpuz to take official cognizance of Lopez’s attendance at CYRC and to pay his salaries and benefits from April 23, 1985, onward. The case was remanded for further proceedings on damages.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s order directing petitioner Corpuz to recognize respondent Lopez’s unauthorized attendance at the CYRC and to pay his corresponding salaries.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the propriety of Corpuz’s administrative actions and the doctrine of state immunity. Lopez’s return to CYRC was unauthorized, as his temporary assignment to the MECS Central Office remained effective until further advice, a fact later confirmed by official indorsements. Corpuz, in refusing to recognize his attendance and withholding his salary from April 23 to August 14, 1985, was merely enforcing a lawful departmental directive and exercising her administrative authority. She acted in good faith, not in a personal capacity, but in the performance of her official functions.
Consequently, adjudging her liable for damages is improper, as it would effectively be a charge against the Republic of the Philippines. The state, as a sovereign, cannot be sued without its consent. The mere allegation that an official is sued personally does not automatically remove the protection of laws governing public officers when the acts in question are clearly official. Therefore, the lower courts erred in ordering the payment of salaries for the period Lopez was not authorized to work and in subjecting Corpuz to potential personal liability for official acts. The Supreme Court set aside the appealed decision.