GR 85481; (October, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 85481 -82 October 18, 1990
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners, vs. HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were among sixteen individuals charged before Military Commission No. 1 in 1975 for the murder of Florentino Lim and illegal possession of a firearm. The case, a cause célèbre in Cagayan de Oro City, was tried by the military tribunal despite requests for transfer to civil courts. After a lengthy trial involving numerous witnesses, the Military Commission promulgated its decision on June 10, 1976. The petitioners, along with five others, were acquitted of all charges and were subsequently released from detention. Martial law ended in 1981, and military tribunals were abolished.
In 1987, following the Court’s landmark ruling in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, which declared military commissions unconstitutional for trying civilians while civil courts were functioning, the State Prosecutor filed new Informations for murder against the petitioners and others before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners moved to quash these new charges, arguing that their acquittal by the military commission constituted a valid defense of double jeopardy. The trial court denied their motion, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners’ acquittal by the Military Commission constitutes a valid defense against a second prosecution for the same offense, barring their retrial in civil court on grounds of double jeopardy.
RULING
No. The acquittal by the Military Commission does not bar a subsequent prosecution in a civil court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioners. The legal logic rests on the fundamental principle that a judgment rendered by a tribunal without jurisdiction is void and produces no legal effect. In Olaguer, the Court definitively ruled that military commissions, being instrumentalities of the executive branch and not part of the judicial system, had no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses cognizable by civil courts during martial law. Consequently, all proceedings conducted by such commissions, including the trial and acquittal of the petitioners, were declared null and void ab initio.
Since the Military Commission acted without jurisdiction, its “acquittal” is a legal nullity. The constitutional right against double jeopardy presupposes a valid first jeopardy, which attaches only upon a conviction or acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. As the military tribunal was not a competent court, no first jeopardy ever attached. Therefore, the petitioners cannot invoke double jeopardy. The State’s act of filing new charges in a court with legitimate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court, is not a second prosecution but the first valid one. The ruling applies retroactively to vacate all void judgments of military commissions over civilians, ensuring uniformity and upholding the supremacy of the civilian judiciary and the constitutional right to due process.
