G.R. No. 85469 March 18, 1992
JOSE RAMIREZ, FE RAMIREZ, JOSEFINA RAMIREZ, ERLINDA RAMIREZ and DIOSDADO RAMIREZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE MINISTER (NOW SECRETARY) OF AGRICULTURE AND FOODS, and VALENTINA VDA. DE MONTERO, respondents.

FACTS

On October 11, 1973, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Fisheries granted a lease over a 9.5040-hectare fishing area in Masinloc, Zambales, to Irene Vda. de Ramirez (now substituted by her heirs, the petitioners) under Fp. A. No. 31471. The order terminated the lease of Vicente Tecson, ordered private respondent Valentina Vda. de Montero to vacate the portion she was occupying, and gave due course to Irene Ramirez’s application. Montero filed a protest against this order on February 29, 1974, which was successively dismissed by the Director of Fisheries (August 12, 1975), the Minister of Natural Resources on appeal (November 21, 1978), and the Office of the President on further appeal (August 11, 1981). Montero then filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Zambales to annul the decision of the Office of the President, which was dismissed on September 27, 1984. The Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal from this dismissal on August 12, 1985.
After this dismissal became final and executory, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the October 11, 1973 order with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) on July 21, 1986. The OIC of BFAR issued an order for its immediate implementation on August 5, 1986. In response, private respondent Montero filed an opposition to the motion for execution with the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Foods on August 13, 1986. Acting on this opposition, the Secretary issued an order on August 26, 1986, holding in abeyance the execution to allow his office to act on the opposition. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on October 2, 1986. Instead of acting on it, the Secretary ordered an investigation and ocular inspection, citing “supervening events” that allegedly affected the implementation of the 1973 order. These events included: (1) the execution of a Deed of Quitclaim on February 18, 1982, by Irene Ramirez and her children in favor of Florentino Cuaresma over a 3.0-hectare portion; (2) the filing of a fishpond application by Cuaresma on March 17, 1982; (3) the death of Irene Ramirez on February 22, 1983; (4) the filing of an application by the Heirs of Catalino Ramirez on August 15, 1984, for 6.5940 hectares; and (5) the claim by Jose T. Reyes of introducing extensive improvements worth about P200,000.00. The Secretary denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on December 17, 1986. The Court of Appeals sustained the Secretary’s order, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether a judgment that had long become final and executory can still be reconsidered and set aside based on alleged supervening events.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution, and its issuance is a ministerial duty. The rule admits of exceptions only when facts and events transpire after the judgment has become final and executory, which on equitable grounds render its execution impossible or unjust. Conversely, facts or events happening prior to the finality of judgment cannot be sanctioned as a basis to frustrate enforcement.
The Court found that all the alleged “supervening events” cited by the Secretary (the quitclaim, Cuaresma’s application, Irene Ramirez’s death, the heirs’ application, and Reyes’s improvements) transpired prior to 1986 when the judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. These should have been raised before the judgment became final. The only permissible remedies after finality are a petition for relief from judgment or an action to set aside the judgment on grounds of extrinsic, collateral fraud, which private respondent did not pursue.
The Court further held that: (1) The death of Irene Vda. de Ramirez is not a supervening event warranting re-investigation; she can simply be substituted by her heirs. (2) Jose T. Reyes, who claimed to have introduced improvements, was a builder in bad faith because he was aware of the defect in Montero’s title (her prior application had been rejected in 1968). A builder in bad faith loses what was built without right to indemnity. (3) The only legitimate supervening event needing determination was the effect of the quitclaim in favor of Cuaresma.
The Supreme Court rendered judgment: (1) ordering Valentina Vda. de Montero and/or her assigns to vacate the fishpond area; (2) remanding the case to BFAR solely to determine the effect of the quitclaim executed in favor of Col. Florentino Cuaresma; and (3) allowing the heirs of Irene Vda. de Ramirez to substitute her in her lease application.