GR 84613; (August, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 84613 ; August 16, 1991
ENGINEER LAMBERTO MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT represented by EUFEMIO DOMINGO, ALBERTO P. CRUZ and BARTOLOME C. FERNANDEZ, JR., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Engineer Lamberto Miranda, City Engineer of Pagadian City, was preventively suspended by order of then President Marcos on June 2, 1978, pending investigation of administrative charges. His suspension lasted until it was lifted on May 7, 1986, and he reassumed his position on May 22, 1986. Subsequently, on October 7, 1986, the administrative case was dropped for lack of evidence. The Sangguniang Panglungsod appropriated funds for his back salaries covering the suspension period, but the City Auditor disallowed the claim. The Commission on Audit (COA) sustained the disallowance, ruling that the order lifting the suspension did not specify entitlement to back salaries and that such payment is allowed only if the employee is exonerated, which COA argued did not occur as the case was merely dropped.
ISSUE
Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion in disallowing Miranda’s claim for back salaries during his preventive suspension.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the COA decision. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that preventive suspension cannot be indefinite and must adhere to statutory time limits. Under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, preventive suspension should not exceed ninety (90) days. Miranda’s suspension, which lasted nearly eight years, was therefore unreasonable and unjustified. The Court, reiterating the doctrine in Garcia v. Executive Secretary, held that an indefinite suspension constitutes a denial of procedural due process. Furthermore, the dropping of the case for lack of evidence substantiates the unjustified nature of the prolonged suspension. Consequently, an employee is entitled to back salaries not only upon exoneration but also when the suspension is unjustified. For equity, Miranda is entitled to backwages equivalent to five years’ pay at his last received rate before suspension, without deductions. The COA’s disallowance, based on a restrictive interpretation, was a grave abuse of discretion as it ignored the illegality of the suspension’s duration.