G.R. No. 84523 , August 2, 1990
SPS. CIPRIANO B. PACUBAS and MARCELA E. PACUBAS, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, as Presiding Judge of RTC, Manila, Branch 32; and ZOSIMO ARRIESGADO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners, the Spouses Pacubas, filed a collection suit before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against International Commodity Company and its owners. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued, and a Toyota Corona sedan in the possession of the defendants was levied upon. Private respondent Zosimo Arriesgado filed a third-party claim over the vehicle and subsequently initiated a separate Replevin suit (Civil Case No. 86-36718) before the RTC of Manila against the Pacubas spouses and the sheriff. The Manila RTC initially dismissed the replevin suit on grounds of duplicity of suits, but this dismissal was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 10224. The CA annulled the dismissal and directed the Manila RTC to reinstate and try the replevin case, a decision which became final.
Upon reinstatement, the Pacubas spouses filed a motion to dismiss the replevin case based on improper venue and litis pendentia (pending litigation). The Manila RTC judge deferred resolution of this motion until trial. Challenging this deferment, the Pacubas spouses filed a Petition for Prohibition with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 13040), arguing the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA dismissed their petition, citing a formal infirmity for failure to attach all pertinent pleadings and, on the merits, finding no abuse of discretion. The Pacubas spouses’ motion for reconsideration, which attached the missing documents, was also denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition for Prohibition and in affirming the Manila RTC’s order deferring the resolution of the motion to dismiss the replevin case.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no reversible error in the CA’s decision. The legal logic is clear and multi-faceted. First, the core substantive issue of litis pendentia had already been conclusively settled by the CA in its prior decision (CA-G.R. SP No. 10224). In that ruling, the CA held that by filing the independent replevin action, Arriesgado was deemed to have abandoned his third-party claim in the Quezon City case, thereby eliminating any conflict of pending litigation. This final ruling binds the parties and cannot be resuscitated. Second, the Manila RTC’s deferral of the motion to dismiss was procedurally sound under Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, as the grounds for dismissal (venue and litis pendentia) did not appear to be indubitable. Third, the CA’s dismissal of the prohibition petition was not based solely on a technicality. While it noted the initial formal defect, it expressly ruled that even considering the belatedly submitted documents, its factual findings and legal conclusions would remain unchanged. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that its review power in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law. The assessment of the attached documents and the factual circumstances underpinning the CA’s decision are conclusive and not subject to re-examination. Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the appellate court.