G.R. Nos. 83843-44; April 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Melecio Labrador died in 1972, leaving behind a parcel of land and a holographic will. In 1975, petitioners Sagrado, Enrica, and Cristobal Labrador filed a petition for the probate of this will. Respondents Jesus and Gaudencio Labrador opposed the probate, alleging the will had been revoked by implication of law because Melecio had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor over the same property in 1971. Sagrado also filed a civil case to annul this deed, claiming it was fictitious.
The trial court rendered a joint decision in 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void. It also ordered respondents to reimburse petitioners P5,000, representing a redemption price paid to a subsequent buyer. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision in 1988, denying probate on the ground that the holographic will was undated and setting aside the reimbursement order.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the holographic will of Melecio Labrador complies with the legal requirement of being dated under Article 810 of the Civil Code. A secondary issue is the propriety of the order for respondents to reimburse the P5,000 redemption price.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and allowed the probate of the will. The legal logic centers on the formal requirement for holographic wills under Article 810, which mandates that such a will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator’s own hand. The Court found that the will, written in Ilocano and translated, contained the date “March, 17th day, in the year 1968” within its text. The law does not prescribe a specific location for the date, only that it must be in the will and in the testator’s handwriting, which was satisfied.
The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the date referred only to an internal agreement among family members about partitioning property and not to the execution of the will itself. Examining the tenor of the document, the Court held the testator’s language—referring to his “decision,” “instruction,” and “final disposition”—manifested a clear awareness that he was executing a will to control the posthumous disposition of his estate. The document was a unilateral testamentary act, not a mere contract. On the secondary issue, the Court reinstated the reimbursement order. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale was declared void, the respondents had no authority to later sell the property. Therefore, the P5,000 paid by petitioners to redeem it from a subsequent buyer was a proper expense warranting reimbursement from the respondents who had unlawfully conveyed it.