G.R. No. 82708 ; July 1, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO CLAMOR y SANTIAGO, accused-appellant.

FACTS

Accused-appellant Gregorio Clamor was convicted of murder for the killing of Ricardo Rivera and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution established that on March 27, 1981, Rivera was walking with a companion when a motorcycle with two riders passed by. The back rider shot Rivera. The assailants initially fled but returned, alighted, and shot the victim again before escaping. Eyewitnesses Inocencio Arellano and Eulogio Rivera positively identified Clamor as the gunman. At the hospital, the mortally wounded victim gave an ante mortem statement to a police investigator, naming Clamor as his assailant and expressing his belief that his wounds were fatal.
The defense presented alibi, claiming Clamor was elsewhere during the incident. Appellant challenged the trial court’s appreciation of the victim’s statement as a dying declaration and the credibility of the eyewitness testimonies. He argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, citing alleged inconsistencies and the weak nature of the identification.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder based on the evidence presented, particularly the dying declaration and eyewitness testimonies.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder but modified the penalty. The Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the victim’s ante mortem statement constituted a valid dying declaration under Rule 130, Section 31 of the Revised Rules of Court. The statement was made under a consciousness of impending death, as shown by the victim’s response (“Sa palagay ko po”) when asked if his wounds would cause his death. This declaration, corroborated by the positive identification of two eyewitnesses who knew the appellant, established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the witnesses’ testimonies credible and consistent, and the defense of alibi was weak and unsubstantiated.
However, the Court found that the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery were not sufficiently proven. Only treachery was established, as the attack was sudden and from behind, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself. The circumstance of nocturnity was absorbed in treachery. The Court credited the appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as he presented himself to the police upon hearing rumors of his involvement. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award of damages was sustained.