G.R. No. 82631 February 23, 1995
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and YONG CHAN KIM, respondents.

FACTS

On June 10, 1983, private respondent Yong Chan Kim filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC). The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on June 16, 1986, ordering SEAFDEC to reinstate Yong to his former position with full back wages and to pay moral damages. Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC, in its Decision dated August 20, 1987, affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but increased the moral damages, added exemplary damages, and awarded attorney’s fees. The NLRC denied SEAFDEC’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February 15, 1988. SEAFDEC then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari. On February 14, 1992, the Supreme Court, in a related case, held that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC, as it is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of local agencies. Consequently, SEAFDEC filed a supplemental petition on May 16, 1992, raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Yong opposed, arguing that SEAFDEC was estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue due to its failure to do so earlier, invoking the doctrine of estoppel from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

ISSUE

Whether the National Labor Relations Commission had jurisdiction over SEAFDEC, an international organization, in a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by its employee.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, ruling that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC. SEAFDEC, established by an agreement among several Southeast Asian governments including the Philippines, is an international organization that enjoys diplomatic immunity from local jurisdiction. This immunity is essential to prevent host government interference in its operations and to ensure its impartiality in discharging responsibilities on behalf of its member-states. The Court rejected the application of estoppel, clarifying that the general rule is that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none. The exceptional circumstances in the Tijam case, which justified a departure from this rule, were not present. Furthermore, the Court held that the Tijam doctrine applies only to ordinary litigants and not to entities enjoying sovereign or diplomatic immunity. For such entities, immunity from suit can only be waived expressly by the entities themselves, not by their employees or agents. Consequently, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was made permanent.