G.R. No. 82573 . July 31, 1990.
FELICIDAD ABUTON VDA. DE LAGMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF PEDRO ABUTON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Felicidad Abuton Vda. de Lagman, a daughter from the first marriage of the late Pedro Abuton, filed a complaint for partition, accounting, and damages against her stepmother and eight half-siblings on February 6, 1978. She alleged that she had not received her rightful share in her father’s intestate estate, which was being possessed and administered by the respondents. The respondents opposed the action, asserting it was premature. They contended that Pedro Abuton had incurred substantial debts to finance protracted litigation over a 166-hectare property known as the “Salug case,” and that the estate’s income was needed to cover these expenses.
Crucially, the respondents presented an agreement dated August 5, 1975, signed by Felicidad and her stepmother, Paciencia. This contract stipulated that Felicidad would not demand her share of the estate until after the final termination of the Salug case. The trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld this agreement, dismissing the complaint for prematurity. They ruled that Felicidad had voluntarily waived the immediate exercise of her right to partition, binding herself to await the litigation’s outcome.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner’s action for partition as premature.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal. The legal logic centers on the binding nature of contracts and the conditional accrual of a cause of action. The agreement signed by Felicidad constituted a valid and enforceable contract, not contrary to law, morals, or public policy. By its clear terms, it established the termination of the Salug case as a condition precedent to Felicidad’s right to demand partition. Consequently, her cause of action had not yet accrued when she filed her complaint on February 6, 1978, as the Salug case was still pending appeal at that time.
The Court emphasized that the defect of prematurity or lack of cause of action at the time of filing is not cured by the subsequent fulfillment of the condition during the pendency of the suit. A complaint filed before a cause of action has accrued is inherently premature and must be dismissed. The proper recourse for Felicidad was to file a new or amended complaint after conclusively proving the Salug case had ended. The Court noted that while there was an admission during trial suggesting the Salug case had been decided by the Supreme Court, the requisite judicial decisions and entry of judgment were not formally offered in evidence to properly establish the condition’s fulfillment. Therefore, the dismissal was correct, and Felicidad was directed to refile her action in the proper court.