GR 81031; (February, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 81031 February 20, 1989
DR. ARTURO L. ALEJANDRO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
FACTS
Dr. Arturo L. Alejandro served as the Officer-in-Charge of the President Ferdinand E. Marcos Emergency Hospital (FEMEH) for about four months in 1982, concurrently holding his position as Chief of the Aglipay Emergency Hospital. An information was filed against him and two co-accused for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charge stemmed from the alleged over-expenditure of the hospital’s maintenance and operating expenses (MOOE) allotment for the third quarter of 1982. Funds earmarked for personnel services were used to cover this over-expenditure, resulting in the non-payment of employee salaries for parts of July, August, and September 1982. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty, ruling that his approval of the disbursements constituted gross inexcusable negligence.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner, Dr. Arturo L. Alejandro, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
RULING
The Supreme Court REVERSED the Sandiganbayan’s decision and ACQUITTED the petitioner. The legal logic centered on the failure to prove the essential elements of the crime under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The Court clarified that “gross negligence” in the context of the law implies a palpable breach of duty or a reckless disregard of consequences. The evidence showed that the petitioner, who managed two hospitals simultaneously, relied on the certification of the bookkeeper that funds were available before approving disbursements. This reliance was not grossly negligent, especially given the established past practice of fund transfers within the hospital since 1978, which he merely continued. Furthermore, a critical element of the offense—the causation of undue injury—was not established. The Sandiganbayan itself noted that the employees were eventually paid their full salaries for the period in question by the Regional Health Office on October 27, 1982. Since no actual, quantifiable damage remained, the element of undue injury was absent. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of either evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, or the resulting undue injury, necessary for a conviction under the Anti-Graft law.