GR 78555; (January, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 78555 ; January 30, 1990
ROMULO S. BULAONG and GIL P. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH CXIV, PASAY CITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Romulo Bulaong filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Vicente Vistan and Leonardo Buenaventura with the Pasay City Fiscal’s Office. During the preliminary investigation, Bulaong, assisted by his counsel petitioner Gil de Guzman, submitted a reply-affidavit containing statements describing the respondents as “high calibered and precisioned swindlers.” Consequently, Vistan and Buenaventura filed a libel complaint against the petitioners. An information for libel was filed, alleging the statements were malicious imputations not material to the estafa case.
The petitioners moved to quash the information, arguing the statements constituted absolutely privileged communication as they were made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding—specifically, a reply required during a preliminary investigation. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari, which sought to nullify the trial court’s orders denying the motion to quash the libel information on the ground of absolute privilege.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The central legal logic is procedural: an order denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. As such, it is not appealable, nor is it a proper subject for a petition for certiorari. The correct remedy for the petitioners was to proceed to trial on the merits of the libel case.
During the trial, the petitioners could fully present their defense that the statements were privileged communications made in a preliminary investigation. If convicted, they could then raise the same issue on appeal from the final judgment. The Court emphasized that the prosecution is entitled to prove at trial that the statements were made with actual malice and were not pertinent to the estafa case, thereby defeating any claim of privilege. By seeking certiorari prematurely, the petitioners attempted to circumvent the established judicial process for resolving such factual and legal defenses. The ruling reinforces the doctrine that interlocutory orders, like the denial of a motion to quash, must be challenged through the ordinary course of trial and appeal, not through extraordinary writs.