GR 78269; (February, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 78269 February 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO BACHAR Y GABAY alias ‘ROMY’, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On the evening of October 9, 1984, in Borongan, Eastern Samar, appellant Romeo Bachar, a soldier, had a confrontation with Danny Daza, Nathaniel Boco, and Manuel Contado, who were drinking in front of a store. After an initial altercation where Bachar was overpowered in a fistfight, he left, threatening to return. Later that night, he came back armed with an Armalite rifle. The three men fled to the second floor of the nearby house of Jesus Daza. Bachar followed, removed a fluorescent bulb, and attempted to force open the door, demanding that “Danny Lopez” be brought out. From inside an adjacent bedroom, Jesus Daza asked what he wanted. A gunshot was then heard. Jesus Daza was found dead the next morning.
The appellant denied the charges, presenting an alibi. He claimed that on the night in question, he was sent on an errand, was accosted and assaulted by the three men, but then returned to his barracks where he played chess with fellow soldiers until past midnight. Defense witnesses corroborated his alibi and stated he had no access to a firearm as he was off-duty.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant based on the credibility of prosecution witnesses and circumstantial evidence, and (2) whether the crime was properly qualified as murder with treachery.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the crime from Murder to Homicide. On the first issue, the Court upheld the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. The well-settled rule is that factual findings of the trial court, which had the direct opportunity to observe witness demeanor and conduct, are accorded great weight and respect on appeal. The Court found no cogent reason to overturn these findings. The prosecution witnesses provided consistent and straightforward testimonies detailing the appellant’s motive (the prior fight), his armed return, his actions at the scene, and the immediate gunshot following the victim’s query. This constituted a complete chain of circumstantial evidence that led to the inescapable conclusion of the appellant’s guilt. In contrast, the appellant’s alibi was weak and unsubstantiated, failing to overcome the positive circumstantial evidence presented.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven. The prosecution presented no eyewitness to the actual shooting. The evidence merely established that the appellant was at the scene and a shot was fired. The manner of attack—how the appellant employed means to ensure the execution without risk to himself from any defense the victim might make—was not detailed by any witness. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven as clearly as the crime itself. Absent such proof, the crime is Homicide, not Murder, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
