G.R. No. 77542 . March 19, 1990
ELIAS CARREDO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VICTORIA CATOSTOS, and HON. GENEROSO A. JUABAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Elias Carredo was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial Court. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, he filed a written waiver of his appearance during trial, stating his agreement that the trial could proceed in his absence and that he “admits that he could be identified by witnesses who are testifying at the time that said accused was not present.” At a subsequent hearing, the prosecution moved to recall its principal witness to identify the accused, who was absent. The court rescheduled the hearing and issued a subpoena to Carredo, who failed to appear. His counsel argued his presence could no longer be required due to the waiver.
The municipal judge nevertheless issued an order for Carredo’s arrest and the confiscation of his cash bond. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court, which was dismissed. Hence, this petition, raising the issue of whether an accused who has waived his appearance after arraignment can be compelled to appear for identification under pain of arrest and bond confiscation.

ISSUE

Whether an accused who, after arraignment, executes a written waiver of his appearance during trial can be ordered arrested for failing to appear upon a summons specifically issued for his identification by prosecution witnesses.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that the accused can be compelled to appear for identification despite a prior waiver. The Court anchored its decision on Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (with a counterpart in the 1987 Constitution ), which allows trial to proceed in absentia after arraignment if the accused has been duly notified and fails to appear unjustifiably. However, citing precedents like Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 and People vs. Presiding Judge, the Court held that the constitutional permission for trial in absentia does not deprive the prosecution of its right to have the accused present for identification by witnesses, which is vital for a conviction.
The Court distinguished the petitioner’s waiver from the exception recognized in People vs. Presiding Judge. In that case, the exception applied only if the accused made an unqualified admission in open court after arraignment that he is the very person named as the defendant. Here, Carredo’s written waiver merely stated he “admits that he could be identified by witnesses” in his absence. This was deemed a vague and qualified admission, not the clear, unqualified judicial admission required to excuse his presence for identification. Consequently, his waiver of the right to be present did not release him from his obligation under his bail bond to appear when so ordered by the court. The orders for his arrest and bond confiscation were therefore valid.