GR 77429; (January, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 77429 ; January 29, 1990
LAURO SANTOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Lauro Santos was entrusted with a 1976 Ford Escort by Encarnacion Peñalosa for carburetor repairs. He later persuaded her to have the car repainted. After the agreed period, Peñalosa sought to retrieve her vehicle, but Santos refused to release it unless she paid an additional sum. Despite her attempts, Santos became unavailable and abandoned his shop. Peñalosa later discovered Santos had presented a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase to military authorities, claiming she had sold him the car, leading to the dismissal of an initial carnapping complaint. Subsequently, an information for estafa was filed against Santos in the Regional Trial Court.
The trial court convicted Santos of estafa. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction, finding him guilty of qualified theft instead, and imposed a heavier penalty. Santos elevated the case to the Supreme Court, challenging the factual findings and the sufficiency of evidence against him, particularly relying on the purported Deed of Sale to assert ownership.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of qualified theft and in disregarding his defense anchored on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the offense from qualified theft to simple theft. The Court upheld the factual findings of the lower courts, noting the absence of any recognized exception to justify their reversal. The prosecution’s evidence was deemed conclusive of Santos’ guilt. The Court found the Deed of Sale to be spurious due to evident alterations, deletions, and lack of notarization, rendering it unreliable. Santos’ failure to register the car in his name and his contradictory statements—such as demanding payment for repairs on a car he allegedly owned—further undermined his claim.
The Court held that the respondent court erred in convicting Santos of qualified theft because the information did not allege the circumstance that the subject was a motor vehicle, which is essential for qualification. However, this circumstance, having been proven at trial, was properly considered as an aggravating circumstance. Applying Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the car’s value of P38,000.00, the penalty was adjusted. The Supreme Court sentenced Santos to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years of reclusion temporal, and ordered him to restore the car or pay its value.
