GR 77243; (October, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 77243 October 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA de CEBU, et al., and Honorable RAMON A.M. TORRES, respondents.
FACTS
Associacion Benevola de Cebu filed a petition for registration of Lot 108 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. After an order of general default, the Solicitor General filed a mimeographed opposition and requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu to represent the government at the hearings. The trial court rendered decisions in 1973 and 1975 adjudicating portions of the land to various private respondents. Other oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decisions, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied their petition for review, making the judgment final.
The Office of the Solicitor General received copies of the 1973 and 1975 trial court decisions only on July 1, 1986. It promptly filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 1986. The respondent judge denied this appeal, ruling the decisions had long become final and executory and were already executed. The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the government’s appeal on the ground of finality, considering the date the Solicitor General was officially notified of the decisions.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the respondent judge’s orders. The legal logic centers on the proper reckoning of the appeal period for the government in land registration cases. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive statutory mandate to represent the Government in all land registration proceedings. The Provincial Fiscal, when requested to appear, acts merely as a surrogate or agent of the Solicitor General.
Consequently, the reglementary period for filing an appeal must be computed from the date the Solicitor General’s Office itself receives official notice of the judgment, not from the date a fiscal or any other representative might have been served. The fiscal lacked the authority to decide on an appeal; that power resides solely with the Solicitor General. Since the Solicitor General filed the notice of appeal within the prescribed period from its own receipt of the decisions, the appeal was timely.
Furthermore, substantial justice warrants allowing the appeal. The Solicitor General alleged the existence of a prior land decree in favor of the government, indicating the land is part of the public domain. Dismissing the appeal on procedural grounds would contravene the Regalian doctrine and the state’s duty to conserve its patrimony. The respondent judge’s denial, based on a misapplication of the procedural rule, constituted grave abuse of discretion. The Court directed the trial court to certify and elevate the government’s appeal to the appellate court.