G.R. No. 75693 September 15, 1989
MARCELO BONDOC, as substituted by ROMEO BONDOC, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch LXVI of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, and LORENZO QUIAMBAO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Marcelo Bondoc had leased Apartment No. 3, part of a commercial building, since 1949, paying a monthly rental. In 1974, private respondent Lorenzo Quiambao purchased the building and requested Bondoc to transfer to Apartment No. 4, allegedly assuring him the lease could continue during Quiambao’s lifetime. Bondoc later requested and was permitted to construct a temporary residential structure on an adjacent lot owned by Quiambao, with the understanding he would vacate upon demand and without paying rent for the lot. In 1977, Quiambao demanded Bondoc vacate both the apartment and the lot. Bondoc refused, invoking the alleged lifetime assurance.
Quiambao filed an ejectment complaint. The Municipal Circuit Court ruled for Quiambao. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court ordered Bondoc to vacate the apartment but directed Quiambao to execute a two-year lease for the lot. Bondoc then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the municipal court’s judgment, ordering Bondoc to vacate both the apartment and the lot.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether there was a valid ground for the judicial ejectment of Bondoc from the commercial apartment and the adjacent lot.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The legal logic is clear. First, the lease for Apartment No. 4 was commercial, not residential, as Bondoc operated a tailoring business employing others. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which prohibits ejectment based on mere expiration of lease for residential units, is inapplicable. For commercial leases, Article 1673 of the Civil Code governs. Since the lease was on a month-to-month basis with monthly rentals, it was terminable at the end of any month at the lessor’s option under Article 1673(1) and Article 1687. Quiambao validly terminated it.
Second, Bondoc’s claim of a lifetime lease promise was not clearly established. Regarding the lot, no lease contract existed; Bondoc’s occupation was merely by tolerance, subject to return upon demand. He was only allowed to build a temporary shelter, not the permanent structure he erected. His failure to specifically deny these allegations in the complaint constituted an admission. Consequently, he cannot claim builder in good faith rights or demand reimbursement, nor can he retain possession.
The Court rejected Bondoc’s procedural objections, noting they only delayed the case’s resolution. The essential facts and applicable law mandated his ejectment. The decision was declared immediately executory.