G.R. No. 75693 September 15, 1989
MARCELO BONDOC (substituted by ROMEO BONDOC), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, and LORENZO QUIAMBAO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Marcelo Bondoc had leased Apartment No. 3, part of a commercial building, since 1949, paying a monthly rental of P200.00 for his tailoring business. In 1974, private respondent Lorenzo Quiambao purchased the entire building. At Quiambao’s request, Bondoc transferred to Apartment No. 4, allegedly based on an oral assurance that he could lease it for the lessor’s lifetime. Later, Quiambao permitted Bondoc to construct a temporary residential structure on an adjacent lot owned by Quiambao, without rental, on the condition Bondoc would vacate upon demand.
In 1977, Quiambao demanded Bondoc vacate both the apartment and the lot. Bondoc refused, invoking the alleged lifetime lease promise. Quiambao filed an ejectment complaint, initially prevailing in the Municipal Circuit Court. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court ordered Bondoc’s ejectment from the apartment but directed Quiambao to execute a new two-year lease contract for the lot. Bondoc then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the RTC decision and reinstated the municipal court’s judgment ordering Bondoc to vacate both premises.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the lease over the commercial apartment was validly terminated, and whether Bondoc has a right to retain possession of the lot where he built his house.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The lease is commercial, not residential, as Bondoc operated a tailoring business employing workers, thus falling outside the protective scope of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. Under Article 1687 of the Civil Code, since no fixed period was agreed upon and rent was paid monthly, the lease is deemed to be from month to month. Consequently, under Article 1673, the lessor could judicially eject the lessee upon the expiration of each monthly term. The alleged oral promise of a lifetime lease was not clearly established.
Regarding the lot, Bondoc occupied it only by tolerance, without a lease contract or rental payments, and subject to the condition he would leave upon demand. His construction of a permanent structure, contrary to the agreement for only a temporary shelter, did not confer rights as a builder in good faith. He cannot demand reimbursement nor retain possession. The Court emphasized that Bondoc’s procedural maneuvers unjustly delayed the case, allowing his unlawful possession to continue. The lease had expired, and no right to the lot existed, mandating his ejectment.