GR 74854; (April, 1991) (Digest)
G.R. No. 74854 ; April 2, 1991
JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Cainta, Rizal, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, against private respondent Rufino de Guzman. The action sought the annulment of two deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the recovery of ownership and produce thereof, and damages. Before summons could be served on the defendant, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring a conference on the matter of venue.
Following the conference, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It ruled that the action was a real action affecting title to real property situated outside its territorial jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed this order of dismissal. Petitioner now asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint motu proprio, arguing that the right to object to improper venue belongs solely to the defendant and is waivable.
ISSUE
May a trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition, nullified the appellate court’s decision, and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint. The Court emphasized the crucial distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to decide a case on the merits, while venue pertains to the geographical location or place where the suit may be brought, primarily for the convenience of the parties.
The rule on venue is procedural and relates to the jurisdiction over the person, not the subject matter. Provisions on venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and defendant, not between the court and the subject matter. An RTC has jurisdiction over real actions regardless of where the property lies, as provided under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The requirement that a real action be filed where the property is situated under Rule 4, Section 2 is a rule of venue, which is waivable.
The defendant’s failure to timely object to improper venue in a motion to dismiss constitutes a waiver. The trial court cannot pre-empt this prerogative. At the stage where the complaint was dismissed, the court had not even acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, as summons had not been served. The proper course was to proceed with service of summons under Rule 14, not to dismiss the case motu proprio. The dismissal was a procedural shortcut that deprived the parties of their right to due process.