G.R. No. 73913 . January 31, 1989.
JERRY T. MOLES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIANO M. DIOLOSA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jerry Moles purchased a secondhand linotype printing machine from private respondent Mariano Diolosa for his printing business in Bacolod City. To facilitate a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a pro forma invoice dated April 23, 1977, indicating a price of P50,000, was signed. The actual agreed price was P40,000, with a P10,000 add-on intended for new matrices. The machine was delivered and installed at petitioner’s premises. On August 29, 1977, respondent issued a written certification warranting the machine was in “A-1” condition. After the DBP loan was released, petitioner paid respondent via a DBP check on September 30, 1977, reflected in an official receipt referencing the pro forma invoice.
The machine repeatedly malfunctioned and proved inoperable despite repairs attempted by technicians sent by respondent. Petitioner formally demanded rescission of the sale and damages. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering rescission and awarding damages. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed, dismissing the complaint. It held the action was essentially for breach of warranty, which was barred for having been filed beyond the six-month prescriptive period under Article 1571 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether the action for rescission based on breach of an express warranty is governed by the six-month prescriptive period for redhibitory actions.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Intermediate Appellate Court and reinstated the trial court’s decision. The legal logic is clear: the six-month prescriptive period under Article 1571 applies only to actions arising from implied warranties. The case involved an express warranty, as evidenced by the respondent’s written certification dated August 29, 1977, expressly warranting the machine to be in “A-1” condition. For breaches of express warranties, the general prescriptive period for rescission of contracts under Article 1389, which is four years, applies. Petitioner filed the complaint within one year from the delivery of the machine, well within the four-year period.
Furthermore, the defense of prescription was not raised in the trial court and was invoked only at a belated stage on appeal. As a general rule, the defense of prescription is waived if not raised in a timely manner in the trial court, and no exceptional circumstances justified its consideration at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court also found the trial court’s factual findings on the breach of warranty to be supported by evidence, establishing that the machine was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose.