G.R. No. 73886 . January 31, 1989.
JOHN C. QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MANUEL C. CASASOLA, and ESTRELLITA C. CASASOLA, respondents.

FACTS

The late Dr. Indalecio Casasola, represented by petitioner Atty. John Quirante, sued contractor Norman Guerrero and surety Philippine American General Insurance Co. (PHILAMGEN) for breach of contract. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Dr. Casasola, awarding various damages and attorney’s fees. PHILAMGEN’s appeal was initially denied by the trial court as filed out of time, leading PHILAMGEN to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64334 . During this pendency, Dr. Casasola died, survived by his heirs, including the private respondents.
Petitioners Quirante and Dante Cruz, alleging an oral fee agreement with the deceased later confirmed in writing by some heirs, filed a motion in the trial court for confirmation of their attorney’s fees. Their claim was based on a contingent agreement: a fixed fee for recovery on the surety bond and an equal sharing of any damages awarded in excess of that bond. The trial court granted the motion via orders dated March 20 and May 25, 1984. The heirs who did not sign the confirmation, the private respondents herein, challenged these orders via certiorari in the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the petitioners’ attorney’s fees while the main case awarding the underlying damages was still pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the IAC’s decision setting aside the trial court’s orders, ruling that the confirmation of attorney’s fees was premature. The legal logic is anchored on the contingent and inchoate nature of the claim. While a lawyer may properly assert a contractual claim for fees in the very action where services were rendered to avoid multiplicity of suits, such claim is premature if the judgment from which the fees are to be sourced is not yet final and executory.
Here, the damages awarded by the trial court—the fund from which petitioners’ contingent fees would be paid—were the direct subject of a pending petition ( G.R. No. 64334 ) in the Supreme Court. The Court noted that its subsequent decision in that case had, in fact, set aside the IAC ruling and ordered the trial court to certify PHILAMGEN’s appeal. Consequently, the main case was still unresolved, and the award of damages was not final. Any determination of attorney’s fees dependent on that uncertain award was therefore precipitate.
The Court further held that all related issues, including the binding effect of the alleged fee agreement on non-signatory heirs and the basis for co-petitioner Dante Cruz’s fees, should be ventilated and determined by the trial court only after the final adjudication of the main case. This allows for a complete factual assessment based on the final outcome, ensuring orderly administration of justice. The IAC’s ruling on prematurity was correct, though the Supreme Court clarified that the IAC’s ancillary pronouncement on the effect on non-signatories was also premature and potentially pre-emptive of factual issues for the trial court.