G.R. Nos. 66059-60 December 4, 1989
FILIPINAS INVESTMENT AND FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELIMON CUEVAS, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Felimon Cuevas purchased vehicles on installment from Ace Consolidated, Inc., executing promissory notes and chattel mortgages as security. These credit instruments were subsequently assigned to petitioner Filipinas Investment and Finance Corporation. Due to Cuevas’s default, the petitioner initiated foreclosure proceedings. Cuevas filed a suit (Civil Case No. 61514) to enjoin the foreclosure and challenge the assignment’s validity, while the petitioner filed a separate collection case (Civil Case No. 61651) for another unpaid vehicle. The cases were consolidated. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the delivery of vehicles for foreclosure or payment of their value, and for the payment of the unpaid balance on the truck. This judgment became final and executory in 1969.
A writ of execution was issued. In 1970, Cuevas delivered the two subject vehicles to the sheriff. However, the petitioner later filed new complaints in 1975 (Civil Cases Nos. 83110 and 84625) seeking to collect the very same balances on the promissory notes for those vehicles, alleging that the prior execution was unsatisfied because the cars were delivered in a “dilapidated” condition. The trial court dismissed these new actions, ruling they were barred by the prior final judgment. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed this dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner’s filing of new collection suits in 1975, based on the same promissory notes and causes of action already adjudicated in a 1966 final judgment, is legally permissible.

RULING

No, the new actions are barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, applying the doctrine of res judicata. The 1966 judgment, which had long become final, conclusively settled the rights and obligations of the parties regarding the subject promissory notes and chattel mortgages. By seeking a second recovery on the same cause of action, the petitioner attempted to re-litigate matters already decided. The Court clarified the proper remedy for a judgment creditor who alleges an unsatisfied execution. After the original judgment becomes final, a party cannot indefinitely seek new writs of execution from the rendering court. Once the five-year period for enforcing a judgment by motion has lapsed, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action. To enforce it, the creditor must file a completely new and independent civil action for the revival of the judgment. This new action is based on the judgment itself, not the original cause of action. The petitioner’s 1975 suits were erroneously filed as ordinary collection cases on the promissory notes, not as an action for revival of judgment. Consequently, they constituted an impermissible second bite at the apple and were correctly barred by res judicata. The alleged dilapidated state of the delivered vehicles did not justify circumventing this procedural rule.