G.R. No. 65236 October 12, 1989
MARIA V. DE CASIMIRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. MARCELINO N. SAYO, HON. ALFREDO N. GORGONIO, EXOFICIO SHERIFF RODRIGO N. SAURE, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, District III, Caloocan City, and ELISEO PAMBID, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Maria V. de Casimiro mortgaged her land to Traders Royal Bank to secure loans obtained by her sons. Upon default, the bank foreclosed and purchased the property at auction on August 14, 1979. The certificates of sale were registered, with the redemption period for one expiring on January 11, 1981. Meanwhile, private respondent Eliseo Pambid obtained a judgment against petitioner’s son, Eduardo Casimiro, in a separate case (Civil Case No. C-7669). An alias writ of execution authorized the levy on Eduardo’s rights, including his “rights as redemptioner” in the mortgaged property. On January 6, 1981, a certificate of sale was issued to Pambid conveying Eduardo’s interest. When Pambid offered to redeem from the bank, the bank contacted Eduardo, who stated he would not redeem. Pambid paid the redemption price on January 8, 1981. Neither Eduardo nor Maria redeemed the property before the period lapsed. Pambid consolidated ownership, and a new title was issued in his name.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the redemption of the foreclosed property by respondent Eliseo Pambid, as a judgment creditor of the debtor-mortgagor Eduardo Casimiro, was valid, thereby precluding petitioner Maria de Casimiro, the owner-mortgagor, from recovering the property.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Pambid’s redemption and denied the petition. The legal logic rests on the statutory framework governing redemption rights after an extrajudicial foreclosure. Under Section 6 of Act No. 3135 , the right of redemption is granted explicitly to “the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor.” Eduardo Casimiro, who contracted the loan with the bank using his mother’s property as security with her consent, was the “debtor” referred to in the law. Consequently, his right of redemption was a leviable property interest subject to execution to satisfy the judgment obtained by Pambid. Eduardo’s clear waiver of his right to redeem when contacted by the bank was valid and effective. The Court rejected petitioner’s claim that the right belonged solely to her as the owner. The law designates the debtor, not the owner, as the primary redemptioner. Since Pambid, as a judgment creditor, validly acquired and exercised Eduardo’s right of redemption within the statutory period, his title became indefeasible. Petitioner’s failure to redeem the property herself or to tender the redemption price within the one-year period, and her filing of a reconveyance suit months after the period expired without such tender, precluded any relief. The Court of Appeals correctly found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court’s dismissal of her complaint.