G.R. No. 61754 August 17, 1989
ROBERTO TING and DOLORES TING, petitioners, vs. HON. AUGUSTO E. VILLARIN, FELICIANO GERVACIO, FERDINAND J. GUERRERO, and CONSOLIDATED BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS

Consolidated Bank filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against Perlon Textile Mills and its directors, including petitioner Roberto Ting and his wife Dolores. The complaint contained two causes of action. The first sought recovery on promissory notes signed by corporate officers, including Roberto Ting, in their personal and official capacities. The second cause of action involved violations of trust receipt agreements executed by the corporation and guaranteed by other individuals, not including Roberto Ting. To support the application for attachment, the bank alleged “fraud in contracting an obligation” under the trust receipt agreements. The respondent judge issued the writ, attaching the estates of all defendants, including the conjugal property of the Tings.
The petitioners moved to quash the attachment, arguing that the alleged fraud pertained only to the trust receipt agreements under the second cause of action, to which Roberto Ting was not a party. They also contended the writ improperly pierced the corporate veil and attached conjugal property without legal basis. The respondent judge denied their motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioners.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared the writ null and void. The legal logic is threefold. First, the application for attachment was legally insufficient. The ground of “fraud in contracting an obligation” cannot be sustained by a mere general averment ritually quoting the rules; specific factual circumstances detailing the fraud must be alleged. Fraud is never presumed. The complaint failed to detail what constituted the fraud or how it was perpetrated, rendering the writ issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Second, the writ was improperly issued against petitioner Roberto Ting. The alleged fraud was specifically tied to the trust receipt agreements under the second cause of action. The complaint itself clearly stated that only the corporation and other named individuals were parties to those agreements. Roberto Ting’s involvement was explicitly limited to the promissory notes under the first cause of action. The two causes of action arose from distinct transactions, and no common question of law or fact justified joining him for the purpose of attachment based on the fraud alleged in the second cause.
Third, the attachment of the Tings’ conjugal partnership property was invalid. Dolores Ting was impleaded solely for being Roberto’s spouse. The act of a husband binding himself as a guarantor, as alleged under the first cause of action, does not benefit the conjugal partnership but instead threatens to dissipate its assets. Such an act does not carry the presumption that it was done for the partnership’s benefit. Therefore, the conjugal property could not be validly attached for an obligation arising from such a guarantee. The respondent judge’s orders were declared null and void.