G.R. No. 60952 March 31, 1989
MRS. LEONILA L. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. DR. WILSON TAN, DANTE G. ARDIVILLA, Regional Director, MOLE, Region VII, Cebu City and ATTY. YOLANDA D. BAGUIO, as City Sheriff of Dumaguete City, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonila L. Santiago, proprietress of L & L Santiago Optical Clinic, terminated the services of private respondent Dr. Wilson Tan, an optometrist, on December 31, 1977. Tan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Hearings were scheduled for investigation on April 26 and May 9, 1978. Despite due notice, petitioner and her counsel failed to appear. The hearing officer, based on the ex parte investigation, recommended Tan’s reinstatement with backwages and 13th-month pay. The Regional Director adopted this in an order dated May 18, 1978.
Petitioner received the order on June 28, 1978, but filed a memorandum of appeal only on July 17, 1978, which was deemed filed out of time. A writ of execution was subsequently issued. Over several years, petitioner filed multiple motions to quash the writ, leading to successive writs, suspended executions, and additional hearings. She contended that the initial investigation conducted in her absence and the alleged disregard of her subsequently submitted affidavits constituted a denial of due process.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner was denied procedural due process in the proceedings for illegal dismissal.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no denial of due process. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. The records show petitioner received notice of the scheduled hearings but deliberately chose not to attend, believing her presence was unnecessary as it was merely an “investigation.” This was a tactical error on her part; the hearing was precisely her opportunity to present evidence and refute the claim. Her voluntary absence constituted a waiver of her right to be heard at that stage.
Furthermore, her claim that the Regional Director disregarded her evidence is unfounded. The affidavits she submitted were dated and filed months after the May 18, 1978 order had been issued, and thus could not have been considered in the initial decision. The Court also noted that the protracted proceedings—spanning years with multiple writs, suspended executions, and several hearings on her motions—demonstrated she was afforded ample, even excessive, opportunities to be heard after the initial order. Her due process rights were not violated; she was given notice and opportunity, which she initially forfeited by non-appearance. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.