GR 586; (April, 1902) (Digest)
G.R. No. 586 : April 30, 1902
MARTINIANO VELOSO Y GREY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENITA PACHECO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
On September 28, 1901, the plaintiff, Martiniano Veloso y Grey, filed an action for unlawful detainer against the defendant, Benita Pacheco, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court ordered the case to be tried under the provisions of the old Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law of Civil Procedure). During the trial, the judge, applying the old law, rejected the testimony of the defendant as a witness on her own behalf, as the old procedure did not allow parties to testify. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff on December 20, 1901. On January 4, 1902, after the new Code of Procedure in Civil Actions had taken effect (on October 1, 1901), the defendant moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Articles 113 and 145 of the new Code. The trial judge granted the motion for a new trial on January 13, 1902. The plaintiff appealed this order.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Articles 113 and 145 of the new Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, which allow a motion for a new trial on grounds such as newly discovered evidence, apply to a judgment rendered after October 1, 1901, in a case that was commenced and tried under the old Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
The Court held that Articles 113 and 145 of the new Code apply to all judgments entered after October 1, 1901, regardless of whether the proceedings prior to judgment were conducted under the old or new procedure. The right to move for a new trial on grounds like newly discovered evidence was a new remedy not available under the old Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. This new remedy is substantive and applies by its own force to all cases pending on October 1, 1901, where judgment is rendered thereafter. The legislative intent to grant this remedy is independent of the procedural rules followed during trial. Consequently, the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain and grant the motion for a new trial.
Furthermore, the order granting a new trial is an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. Under Article 123 of the new Code, such an order is not appealable until a final judgment is rendered. Article 146 also specifies that a decision on such a motion is not a ground for exception (appeal). Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. No costs were awarded.