G.R. No. L-55694 October 23, 1981
ADALIA B. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, ESTER FRANCISCO, ADELUISA FRANCISCO and ELIZABETH FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena City and JOSEFINA D. LAGAR, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Josefina D. Lagar filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against petitioners, alleging her father wrongfully titled a conjugal property in his name alone after her mother’s death and subsequently sold it to petitioners’ predecessor. After petitioners filed their answer, the case was set for pre-trial. Petitioners failed to appear, leading the respondent judge to declare them in default and allow private respondent to present evidence ex-parte on the same day, January 8, 1980. Immediately after the ex-parte presentation, the respondent judge rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Private respondent, through new counsel, filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration on February 16, 1980, alleging her prior counsel’s fault led to unprepared evidence presentation. The motion was denied on April 28, 1980, for being filed out of time, as the 30-day period from service of the decision on January 15 had lapsed. Subsequently, through another new counsel, she filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 on May 7, 1980, claiming excusable neglect due to her lack of preparation and misunderstanding during the ex-parte hearing. The respondent judge granted this petition on October 8, 1980.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulled the respondent judge’s resolution, and reinstated the final and executory decision of January 8, 1980. The Court ruled that the petition for relief was procedurally improper and time-barred. First, a petition for relief under Rule 38 is an extraordinary remedy available only when a party has not filed a timely motion for new trial. Since private respondent had already availed herself of a motion for new trial (albeit filed out of time and denied), she was precluded from subsequently filing a petition for relief; these remedies are mutually exclusive.
Second, the petition for relief was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period from knowledge of the judgment, as required by Section 3, Rule 38. The period began to run on January 15, 1980, when her counsel of record was served with the decision. Notice to counsel is deemed notice to the client for this purpose. Her self-serving claim that she only learned of the judgment on March 17, 1980, was belied by the fact she personally signed and swore to the allegations in her earlier motion for new trial filed on February 16, 1980. The Court emphasized it could not countenance successive accusations of counsel’s incompetence to justify procedural lapses. Consequently, the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the time-barred petition for relief.