GR 55357; (October, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-55357 October 30, 1981
ROLANDO DIONALDO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE AUXENCIO DACUYCUY, Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Province of Leyte, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Rolando Dionaldo was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. After he had entered a plea of not guilty to the homicide charge, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information. The proposed amended information sought to charge Dionaldo with the more serious crime of murder, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.
The prosecution’s motion explained that an affidavit from the complaining witness indicated the attack was sudden, justifying the allegation of treachery. This circumstance was known to the prosecution from the outset but was not originally included in the information. Dionaldo’s counsel opposed the amendment, but the respondent judge granted the prosecution’s motion. Dionaldo then filed this petition to nullify the judge’s order allowing the amendment.
ISSUE
Whether an information for homicide can be amended to charge murder after the accused has pleaded not guilty, without violating the rules on criminal procedure and placing the accused in double jeopardy.
RULING
The petition is granted. The amendment from homicide to murder after a plea is prohibited. The relevant rule is Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph permits amendment as to matters of form after a plea, at the court’s discretion, provided the defendant’s rights are not prejudiced. A change from homicide to murder is not a mere formal amendment; it is a substantial alteration with serious consequences for the accused, as it increases the severity of the offense and potential penalty. Therefore, such an amendment is proscribed under the first paragraph.
The second paragraph of the rule, which the respondent judge relied upon, allows a court to dismiss the original information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense if a mistake is discovered before judgment, provided double jeopardy is not incurred. However, this provision contemplates the filing of a substitute information, not an amendment of the existing one. In this case, dismissing the homicide information to file a new one for murder would place Dionaldo in double jeopardy. He had already been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the homicide charge before a court of competent jurisdiction. A dismissal for the purpose of filing a more serious charge would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Court set aside the respondent judge’s order admitting the amended information.