G.R. No. L-55226. February 28, 1989.
NIC V. GARCES and INES GARCIA-GARCES, Spouses, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, Judge, CFI, Branch III, Bacolod City, and HERNAN MAGLUPAY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the spouses Garces, were defendants in a damages suit filed by respondent Hernan Maglupay before the Court of First Instance of Bacolod. Maglupay alleged forcible ejectment and illicit demolition of his house on the Garceses’ land. The Garceses countered that Maglupay was a tenant obligated to vacate upon demand and had refused to surrender the premises despite advance notice for a construction project. During trial, after incomplete cross-examination on June 20, 1980, the parties agreed to resume hearings on three specific dates: August 14, 22, and 28, 1980.
On August 13, 1980, the Garceses’ counsel filed an urgent motion to postpone the August 14 hearing, citing a conflicting commitment to give expert testimony before another judge. When the case was called on August 14, respondent Judge Valenzuela denied the motion, declaring it lacked merit and was manifestly dilatory. He terminated the cross-examination of Maglupay’s witness, allowed Maglupay to present further evidence ex parte, and then rested Maglupay’s case. In the same proceeding, the judge also cancelled the two remaining agreed hearing dates of August 22 and 28.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement for the first scheduled hearing date and, more critically, in cancelling the two subsequent hearing dates, thereby depriving the petitioners of their right to present evidence.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated that the grant or denial of a postponement rests on the sound discretion of the trial court, which should consider all attendant circumstances and the parties’ rights. This discretion is not to be interfered with unless clearly abused. The policy is to grant postponements only on meritorious grounds, with no party having an absolute right to a grant, but the paramount objective is to serve justice and fairness by allowing cases to be fully ventilated on the merits.
The factual milieu was deemed almost identical to Padua v. Ericta. Here, the motion was the first such application by the defense, grounded on counsel’s professional commitment in another court—a reason not inherently unmeritorious or manifestly dilatory. The record disclosed no justifiable basis for the trial judge’s conclusion of dilatory intent. Even assuming the denial for August 14 was proper, the Court ruled it was grave abuse to cancel the two subsequent hearing dates. This action prematurely and unjustly foreclosed the defendants’ fundamental right to complete their cross-examination and present their evidence, especially when no substantial prejudice to the plaintiff was shown, and there was no indication the defendants would fail to appear on the remaining dates. The ends of justice require that parties be afforded a full opportunity to present their case. The assailed orders were annulled, and the case was remanded for resumption and completion of the trial.