G.R. No. L-53766 October 30, 1981
MARIA C. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Judge JESUS R. DE VEGA of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan Malolos Branch II and the MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY Bulacan, respondents.

FACTS

The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, through the private law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia, filed a complaint for the recovery of a 74-hectare fishpond. The complaint included an allegation that the municipality had obligated itself to pay the law firm attorney’s fees equivalent to twenty percent of the amount recovered. The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and the Municipal Attorney of Hagonoy entered their appearance as counsel for the municipality, with a manifestation that the private counsel would be under their control and supervision. Petitioner Maria C. Ramos, a defendant in that case, moved to disqualify the private law firm. The trial court denied the motion, a decision sustained by the Court of Appeals, which noted the head of the law firm volunteered to serve his native town.
Subsequently, in a second motion for reconsideration, Ramos highlighted the contractual claim for a contingent fee in the complaint. The Court of Appeals, while denying reconsideration, directed the law firm to amend the complaint by deleting the claim for attorney’s fees. The firm complied, filing an amended complaint alleging it was retained without any obligation for payment. Ramos contested the propriety of admitting this amended complaint while a restraining order was in effect. The Court of Appeals did not resolve this contention, prompting Ramos to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether a municipality may hire and be represented by a private counsel in a lawsuit, in collaboration with or under the supervision of the Provincial Fiscal and Municipal Attorney.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled negatively, reversing the decisions of the lower courts. The representation of a municipality in court is governed by mandatory statutory law. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides that the Provincial Fiscal shall represent the municipality in any court, except in specific adversarial intra-provincial cases. A special attorney may only be employed if the provincial fiscal is disqualified. This legislative intent is reinforced by the Local Autonomy Act and the Decentralization Act, which designate the Municipal Attorney, a salaried official, as the municipality’s legal counsel.
Settled jurisprudence consistently holds that a municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is strictly limited to situations where the Provincial Fiscal is disqualified. The lawmaker intended to prevent municipalities from incurring the expense of private counsel and assumed that government lawyers, as accountable civil servants, would best protect municipal interests. The Court found the lower courts’ allowance of the private law firm’s appearance to be a grave abuse of discretion constituting a transgression of these clear legal mandates.
The Court dismissed the argument that the services were offered gratuitously, as the original complaint belied this claim. The subsequent amendment to remove the fee obligation was immaterial, as it could not cure the fundamental illegality of the private representation itself. The law is clear and requires no interpretation; only the Provincial Fiscal and Municipal Attorney may represent the municipality in its lawsuits. Consequently, the appearance of the Cruz law firm was declared contrary to law.