G.R. No. L-52451, L-52678, L-53393. March 31, 1981.
ZACARIAS A. TICZON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

RAMON ARMEDILLA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR P. DIZON, respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated cases arose from the 1980 local elections in San Pablo City. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Cesar P. Dizon as the duly elected mayor. Petitioners Zacarias A. Ticzon and Ramon Armedilla challenged this proclamation. A critical procedural fact is that on February 6, 1980, the Supreme Court issued a resolution in G.R. No. L-52451 that included a restraining order directed at the COMELEC.
Despite the existence of this Court-issued restraining order, the COMELEC proceeded with its processes related to the canvass and proclamation. The majority of the Court, in a decision penned by Justice Aquino, ultimately upheld Dizon’s proclamation, applying the prevailing doctrine from Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections which accords finality to COMELEC proclamations absent grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the COMELEC’s act of proceeding with the canvass and proclamation despite the Supreme Court’s restraining order constitutes a failure to obey a lawful order of the Court, thereby undermining judicial authority and the rule of law.

RULING

Chief Justice Fernando, in his dissenting opinion, voted to set aside the majority decision. His dissent is grounded not on the factual appraisal of the election results but on a fundamental principle of judicial supremacy and constitutional order. He argues that once the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and issued a restraining order, it was incumbent upon the COMELEC, as a constitutional body, to obey that directive.
The legal logic is anchored on the Court’s role as the final arbiter of legal questions. Citing Marbury v. Madison and the Philippine case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Fernando emphasizes that it is the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. This power of judicial review imposes a correlative duty on all agencies of government, including independent constitutional commissions like the COMELEC, to comply with the Court’s orders. While the COMELEC enjoys wide discretion in election matters, its independence is not absolute and is subject to the Supreme Court’s certiorari powers under the Constitution. By proceeding despite the restraining order, the COMELEC failed to accord the Supreme Court the respect and obedience due to it, thereby eroding the rule of law. Fernando concurs with the conclusion in Justice Melencio-Herrera’s separate dissent that it was premature for any party to assume the mayoral office under these circumstances, as the COMELEC’s actions created a deplorable situation that could have been avoided by simply seeking a clarification or lifting of the Court’s order.