G.R. No. L-52235 October 28, 1980
JOSE D. CALDERON, SR., BELEN F. CALDERON, ALEJANDRO F. DIZON, JOSE F. CALDERON, and ARTIMON R. ALA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE GREGORIO C. PINEDA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ANTONIO C. AMOR, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Antonio C. Amor served as Executive Vice President of Luzon Brokerage Corporation (LBC). After petitioner Jose D. Calderon, Sr. acquired full ownership of LBC in November 1976, Amor continued in his position until his resignation on December 31, 1977. Amor filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against LBC and the individual petitioners, claiming unpaid salaries, allowances, reimbursable expenses, moral and actual damages totaling over P2 million, and demanding the assignment of 1,200 LBC shares allegedly promised to him. He alleged the petitioners fraudulently and oppressively withheld his valid monetary claims.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that claims arising from employer-employee relations fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under the Labor Code. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that no employer-employee relationship existed at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s jurisdiction, applying the curative and retrospective effect of Presidential Decree No. 1367, which amended the Labor Code to explicitly exclude claims for moral or other forms of damages from the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.

ISSUE

Whether the regular courts or the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC have exclusive jurisdiction over the case for unpaid salaries, allowances, expenses, damages, and a claim for shares of stock.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that jurisdiction is vested in the regular courts. The legal logic hinges on the intrinsic nature of the controversy as determined by the allegations in the complaint. While claims for unpaid salaries and allowances could suggest a labor dispute, the complaint primarily alleged a tortious act—a fraudulent and oppressive refusal to pay—which violates a right as a member of civil society, not merely a right under labor laws. Crucially, the claim for the assignment of corporate shares is a matter completely beyond the competence of a Labor Arbiter. Following the precedent in Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines Malale Veneer & Plywood Co., Inc., the Court held that where the principal cause of action is for damages arising from a perceived tort, and where the claim includes items like corporate shares unrelated to labor standards, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute. To hold otherwise would sanction an obnoxious split jurisdiction. Furthermore, the amendatory PD No. 1367, which removed the Labor Arbiter’s authority over damage claims, was correctly applied retrospectively by the Court of Appeals, curing any initial question about the trial court’s jurisdiction. The withdrawal of LBC from the proceedings was immaterial, as the individual petitioners were sued for their alleged personal tortious acts. Certiorari was denied.