GR 51385 86; (January, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-51385-86 January 22, 1993
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Damaso de Guzman, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Damaso de Guzman, a 70-year-old retired teacher, was charged with two counts of rape against the 16-year-old complainant, Virginia Viar, who was working as a housemaid in his house in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Virginia testified that the first rape occurred on December 15, 1974, when De Guzman’s family was away. He entered her room at midnight, boxed her thighs, removed her panties, and deflowered her, threatening to kill her if she told anyone. The second rape occurred under similar circumstances on December 29, 1974, with De Guzman again threatening her with a knife. Virginia did not immediately report the rapes out of fear. She left her employment on January 1, 1975, and later revealed the incidents to her brother after experiencing vomiting. A medical examination on March 10, 1975, revealed two healed hymenal lacerations and pregnancy. She gave birth to a baby boy on October 3, 1975, naming De Guzman as the father in the birth certificate. In his defense, De Guzman pleaded impotence due to age, claimed his family was present on the alleged dates, suggested Virginia’s pregnancy was caused by her half-brother, and alleged the complaint was motivated by his refusal to grant her family a loan.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. Subsumed therein are the credibility of the complainant’s testimony, the plausibility of the defense of impotence and alibi, and the correctness of the penalties and civil liabilities imposed by the trial court.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalties and civil liabilities. The Court found Virginia’s testimony straightforward and credible, detailing an outrage that could not have been concocted. It rejected De Guzman’s defense of impotence, noting his admission that he could still have sexual intercourse with his wife around the time he turned 70 and his observed strong and husky physical condition. His alibi that other persons were in the house was unsupported by evidence, notably by the non-presentation of his wife as a witness. The Court also rejected the claims that the sexual act was consensual or that the complaint was motivated by a loan refusal, finding no evidence for these. The Court held that Virginia’s failure to immediately report the rapes was explained by the accused’s threats and the moral ascendancy he held over her as her employer. However, the trial court erred in equating reclusion perpetua with life imprisonment, as they are distinct penalties. It also erred in ordering a married rapist to recognize the offspring; under Article 345(3) of the Revised Penal Code, he cannot be compelled to recognize the child but can be required to provide support. The Court modified the judgment: (a) sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua for each rape; (b) setting aside the order to recognize the child but requiring him to provide support; and (c) increasing the award of moral damages to P30,000.00.
