G.R. No. 50480 December 14, 1979
CONTINENTAL BANK, petitioner-appellant vs. HON. JOEL P. TIANGCO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, STAR LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a final and executory judgment on September 26, 1967, ordering the private respondents to pay Continental Bank solidarily. The judgment was based on evidence presented before a deputy clerk of court commissioned to receive it after the defendants were declared in default for non-appearance at pre-trial. The judgment remained unsatisfied despite a writ of execution.
On March 17, 1977, the bank, through its Statutory Receiver, filed a complaint for the revival of the judgment, alleging partial payments had been made. The private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: first, that the action for revival had prescribed, and second, that the original judgment was void because it was based on evidence heard by a deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss via a minute order without specifying its reasons.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the action for revival of judgment had prescribed; and (2) whether the original judgment is void for having been based on evidence received by a deputy clerk of court.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal. First, the action for revival was filed within the prescriptive period. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its finality. After that period but before being barred by the statute of limitations, it may be enforced by action. The prescriptive period for enforcing a judgment by action is ten years under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. The judgment was rendered on September 26, 1967, and the revival action was filed on March 17, 1977. This is within the ten-year period from rendition, not to mention the later date of its entry. The respondents’ computation alleging a lapse of over ten years was erroneous.
Second, the original judgment is valid and enforceable. It was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and was not vitiated by extrinsic fraud or lack of due process. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the respondents, who even acquiesced to the judgment’s validity by making partial payments. Their challenge to the delegation of evidence reception to the deputy clerk of court comes too late. There was no showing they objected in the lower court, nor that they were prejudiced by the procedure, or that the commissioner committed any mistake, abuse, or fraud. A judgment based on evidence received by a commissioner, absent any showing of grave abuse or denial of due process, remains valid. The trial court’s issuance of a minute order without stating reasons for dismissal was also admonished, as it hinders appellate review.