GR 49212; (July, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. 49212 ; July 31, 1947
ERIBERTO DE LAS ALAS, recurrente-apelante, vs. EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido-apelado.
FACTS
In Criminal Case No. 5 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Melchor de las Alas and his son Eriberto de las Alas were accused of homicide. The trial court acquitted Melchor. Eriberto pleaded self-defense and defense of his father. The trial court accepted the plea of incomplete self-defense and sentenced Eriberto de las Alas to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, with accessories, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jovencio Atienza in the sum of P2,000, with subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay half of the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed this sentence on May 31, 1943, and a motion for reconsideration was denied. The appellant (Eriberto de las Alas) comes before the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari, assigning three errors committed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court can review and overturn the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals regarding the sufficiency of provocation to negate a complete plea of self-defense.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the appeal. The Court held that its appellate jurisdiction in cases coming from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, not errors of fact. The Supreme Court does not have the authority to review the evidence and decide whether the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are erroneous or unjustified, nor to alter or modify such findings of fact. The determination of whether there was sufficient provocation to prevent the complete allowance of the plea of self-defense is a question of fact, a matter of appreciation of evidence with which the Supreme Court cannot interfere. The Court cited Section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, and pertinent jurisprudence (e.g., Mateo v. Insular Collector of Customs, Guico v. Mayuga) to support this limitation on its jurisdiction. The costs were taxed against the appellant.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Perfecto, dissenting, argued that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was rendered on May 31, 1943, during the Japanese occupation by a tribunal not established under the authority of Philippine laws or the Constitution, and should therefore be considered null and void for the reasons stated in Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon. Given that the evidence in the case had been destroyed, he was of the opinion that the reconstitution of the evidence should be ordered so the Supreme Court could revise it, or, if reconstitution was impossible, a new trial should be ordered.